th and 38 th (2004-05) Canadian Parliaments over a multidimensional policy space. The results demonstrate that policy debates are two-dimensional in Canada. The first dimension represents the division between governing and opposition parties that has been found in similar parliamentary systems. The second dimension captures the opposition between Quebec and western provinces. There is a clear regional division between the Reform Party (and later the Conservative Party) and the Bloc Quebecois in both Parliaments; whereas the Liberals and the NDP occupy the center on this legislative dimension. We also note that the newly formed Conservative Party has moved closer to the center in the 38 th Parliament.
In this article, we propose to analyze legislative voting in Canada by applying a Bayesian simulation procedure to estimate a two-dimensional item-response model on recorded divisions for the 35 th and 38 th Parliaments.
This technique is based on the spatial theory of voting (Downs, 1957; Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970) where legislators are arranged geometrically in a low-dimensional policy space that reflects fundamental policy and ideological preferences (Hinich and Munger, 1997) . The distribution of these preferences form a spatial map that demonstrates how divisions in the legislature represent partisan affiliation, regionalism, or voting polarization over time (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007 , 1991 Poole, 2005; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004; Heckman and Snyder, 1997) . Since party discipline is usually very strong in a Westminster style parliamentary system, we may find that there is little variation in the actual location of members from the same party over the course of a legislative session. However, the location of the party groups in relation to one another should provide us with a mapping of cross party voting coalitions. In the Canadian context, we believe that this is very important since the party system has experienced some major transformations in recent years.
For instance, the introduction of two new parties in the 35 th Parliament has been associated with the emergence of a salient dimension of conflict in which Quebec nationalists (represented by the Bloc Quebecois) have been opposed to western regionalists (represented by the Reform Party, which was renamed the Canadian Alliance in 2000) (Flanagan, 1998) . We believe that this opposition goes beyond the traditional division found in the principal di-mension of legislative voting that usually sets the governing party(ies) against opposition party(ies) in parliamentary systems . This is because the Bloc Quebecois has vowed to prioritize the interests of Quebec in all votes, regardless of whether a bill originates from the government or not. The opposite pattern of legislative behavior may also be found within the Reform Party since this formation originates from a pro-western, socialconservative and anti-Quebec movement (Laycock, 2002) . Consequently, the primary task in this study of parliamentary voting will be to determine whether the difference between these two parties actually reflects regional conflicts in Canada.
A second major recent transformation in the Canadian party system is related to the merger of the Canadian Alliance with the Progressive Conservative Party in December 2003. One of the principal objective of this party fusion was to broaden the electoral appeal of the right by creating a more moderate coalition of former Reformist and Conservative MPs (Members of Parliament) -especially on issues that opposed Quebec to western Canada (Belanger and Godbout, 2008) . In this study, we aim to test the validity of this claim by comparing the spatial location of Reformers and Conservatives in a pre and a post-merger environment to determine whether this merger has created a more moderate right wing party in the House of Commons.
We will test these two claims by analyzing all recorded divisions in the The paper is organized as follow. In the first section, we provide a brief overview of some of the most important spatial analysis of legislative voting.
In the subsequent section, we explain in more details the recent changes in the Canadian party system. In this section, we also introduce the two research hypotheses (the regional conflict dimension and the moderation hypotheses)
that will guide the remaining empirical study of legislative voting. In the third and fourth sections, we present the data and methodology employed in our analysis of votes and review some of the key findings. In the final section, we conclude.
LEGISLATIVE VOTING IN THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES
The geometric analysis of legislative votes in a multidimensional space is a common practice in the United States Congress (e.g Poole and Rosenthal, 2007 , 1991 Poole, 2005; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004; Heckman and Snyder, 1997) , Latin America (e.g Morgenstern, 2004; Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002) , and the European Union (e.g. Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007; Mattila and Lane, 2001 ). The logic behind this type of study is that legislators have underlying ideal points (or preferences) across a set of policy alternatives (Hinich and Munger, 1997) . In the geometric model of voting, the distribution of ideal points forms a spatial map that summarizes the composition of the legislature. These ideal points are calculated by aggre-gating the outcome of individual roll call votes (or recorded divisions as in the Canadian case) to create vote-based scores for each legislator in distinct choice spaces. In this context, the choice spaces are much like a road map and provide a visualization of the political world (Poole, 2008) . Lawmakers who are close together on the map tend to have similar voting records, and the spatial distribution of all legislators corresponds to the dimensions of conflict within the legislature.
One of the principal characteristics of the spatial analysis of legislative voting is that the distribution of preferences (or ideal points) between legislators generally reflects different partisan coalitions (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004) . In the United States Congress for example, Democrats are inclined to cluster together at one extreme and Republicans at the other, while moderates like Senator Joe Lieberman situate between these two groups.
This is because party members are more likely to have similar voting records over the course of a legislative session. The most important finding of the geometric analysis of legislative voting is that much of the behavior in Congress can be explained by a stable, low-dimensional issue space, which is generally limited to no more than two dimensions. And this is true in a variety of national assemblies. For example, found that to be true in Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
This low dimensionality implies that voting on certain unrelated issues will be a fairly good predictor of future legislative votes. In the United States, conservative lawmakers today generally favor lower taxes and oppose abor-tion, whereas liberal lawmakers favor a higher level of income redistribution and gun control. Poole and Rosenthal (1997; 2007) explain that in the U.S.
Congress, the first dimension represents the traditional ideological conflict along the left-right ideological spectrum which generally relates to the role of government in the economy. The second dimension represents different policy issues that are specific to certain periods in United States history, such as slavery, civil rights, but also bimetallism and the free coinage of silver (Poole, 2008) . In recent years, the primary dimension has accounted for more than 90% of the variation in all roll call choices by members of Congress (Poole, 2005) . Any remaining votes that cannot be explained along party line (the first dimension) falls theoretically onto a second dimension which in the U.S. represents a different type of conflict located outside of the traditional left/right party opposition (such as the conflict between southern Democrats and northern Democrats/Republicans over civil rights in the 1960s).
Of course the geometric analysis of legislative voting is not well suited for every type of legislature. In the most perfect scenario, the absence of parties, log-rolls, or other factors affecting legislative preferences could theoretically give us the precise location of a lawmaker's preference on a given policy dimension (or a specific policy issue). However, most legislatures have some institutional characteristics that constrain the behavior of its members (such as committee gate keeping powers, party whips, or amendment rules).
Generally, the absence of political parties allows for the greatest amount of liberty; like in the Confederate Congress (Jenkins, 1999) , the Irish Free State Senate (Sircar and Hoyland, Forthcoming), or the United Nations (Voeten, 2000) . In this context, legislative actors have the most opportunity to vote according to their own preferences. But even under these conditions, log-rolls, strategic behavior or position-taking can theoretically lead representatives to vote against their underlying interests.
Nevertheless, in countries like the United States where party discipline is weaker than in most parliamentarian systems, we find that given a sufficiently large number of votes, the interpretation of the first dimension of conflict can be conceptualized as the left-right ideological continuum. However, in parliamentary systems where party discipline is usually much stronger, studies of legislative voting have reached a different conclusion about the meaning of the primary spatial dimension of voting. In their study of legislative behavior in fourteen parliaments, concluded that the dominant feature of voting in most parliamentary systems corresponds to a division between government and opposition members; not the classical leftright conflict which is generally assumed to be the present in the congressional legislative literature (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006) . Hix and Noury explain that opposition parties usually vote against the government, regardless of whether they prefer a government legislation to the existing status quo.
In other words, opposition members vote against the government to signal their opposition rather than their discontent with a particular proposal. This pattern occurs because the government needs to sustain the confidence of a majority of members of the elected assembly in a parliamentary system, and the opposition parties can attempt to weaken the executive by voting against most legislations and government motions (Docherty, 1997) . One extreme example of such a legislature is the Australian Parliament (Jackman, 2001) , where party discipline induces little or no variance in the voting profiles of legislators from the same party. On the other hand, we find much more variance in the Brazilian case Desposato, 2006) , where an important proportion of MPs switch their allegiance between parties when casting votes in the Congresso Nacional.
Hix and Noury (2007) also find that the traditional ideological opposition between the left and the right actually falls on a second dimension of conflict in most of the parliaments they study. The authors explain that this second dimension can account for a significant amount of voting variance and captures divisions which occur within the government or opposition parties (as opposed to the first dimension where we find conflict across the government and the opposition). We believe that this type of spatial mapping will be more common in parliaments where there is both a strong regional and socioeconomic opposition in the legislature. Canada fits nicely into this category since it has the federal system which guarantees regional representation in the Senate but also in the House of Commons.
THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT
It has generally been assumed that studying voting in the Canadian Parliament would reveal very little in the way of individual legislative behavior since party discipline is so strong. This assumption has largely remained unchallenged because "the collection of Canadian voting data is hampered both by a substantive technical problem also found in other legislaturesmembers are identified in records by name but not party, making data collection an exceedingly tedious and resource-intensive task." (Malloy, 2003, p.169 (Jackman, 2006; Poole, 2007 Poole, , 2008 . The following section will focus on the recent transformations of the Canadian party system and explain how a geometric analysis of legislative voting can help us understand these developments.
The most important of these transformations is related to the emergence Alliance (Flanagan, 1998) (Woolstencroft, 1994) because the Reformists addressed issues of alienation and disenchantment (Bernard, 1996) . Following the rejection of the second round of constitutional negotiations in 1992, six members of the Conservative caucus from Quebec resigned and formed a new political party, the Bloc Quebecois; which was to be de- Quebecois is still the third largest party group in parliament. However, like
Belanger and Godbout (2008), we believe that the merger will have moved an important proportion of Conservatives MPs closer to the Liberals (and the New Democratic Party) when we look at their voting records on issues related to Quebec, language, or provincial rights. However, before proceeding with the actual empirical analysis, we discuss in the next section our voting model, data and estimation methodology.
VOTING MODEL, DATA, AND ESTIMATION
The hypotheses are developed within the framework of the spatial theory of voting, where both actors and policy alternatives are located in a lowdimensional policy space. In order to obtain the ideal policy location (or the ideal point) for each Member of Parliament, it is necessary to calculate their individual location using a binary discrete choice model. It is important to note that we do not observe the ideal point of the decision-maker in the datai.e. we can only observe their voting decisions. Therefore, we use a standard
Bayesian item-response model set-up to estimate these ideal points. Other methods such as Optimal Classification Scaling (Poole, 2008) and NOMI-NATE (Poole, 2007) could also have been used. The main advantage of the Bayesian approach is that the stochastic error component within the voting decision is not associated with the legislator's spatial location. Rather, it is attached to the location of a specific bill in the policy space (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004) . This nuance makes intuitive sense if we consider the fact that uncertainty is more likely to be related with the location of a bill, rather than with an individual's legislator own policy preference (Clinton, 2007; Martin and Quinn, 2006 Table 1 shows the composition of the two parliaments.
[ will show, we are also interested in some of the other parameters found in the model. These parameters allow us to evaluate the dimensionality of the Canadian legislature, and whether a single or two-dimensional Euclidian space is sufficient to account for most of the variation in legislative voting.
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RESULTS
Since Canada has a parliamentary system where strong party discipline is the norm (Dyck, 1993; Longley, 1998; Garner and Letki, 1995; Massicotte, 1989) , it has generally been assumed that any study of recorded legislative votes would only yield a limited amount of information. In his historical description of parties, Carty (1988) explains that party discipline was much weaker in earlier federal parliaments. However, strict party discipline has been enforced in modern parliaments. It is very unlikely today that we will find many independent Liberal or Conservative "loose fish" who do not support their own party (Kornberg and Mishler, 1976) . In one of the few existing studies that focuses on party discipline in the Canadian context, Kam (2001) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , and 17 per cent in 34 th Parliament (1988 Parliament ( -1993 .
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According to these calculations, the overall level of dissenting votes was 22
per cent for all parties in the 35 th Parliament.
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In tables 2 and 3, we report a slightly different measure of voting dissention which calculates the overall level of voting unity for each party for the 35 th and 38 th Parliaments. This unity score, which is similar to the one computed by Poole (2008) for the U.S. Congress, is obtained by averaging the percentage of times members voted against a majority of their own party.
We also present in both tables the level of cross party voting among the different parties. To obtain this score, we divided the total number of times individual MPs voted with the majority of a given party by the total number of votes that each casted in a legislative term. The number reported in each row of the tables is the average of this ratio for all members of the same party. Hence, the higher the value, the higher the level of legislative support for this party.
[ In return, this could imply that certain parties are closer together in the spatial mapping of the legislature. As long as we find some variation in voting across different parties, the geometric analysis of recorded votes will identify the location of all MPs -and by extension their party-in a multidimensional policy space. Hence, this explains why we report the level of cross party voting in both tables.
[ (2007) label the government/opposition dimension of conflict in the legislature, and any other division that may exist between the parties is through a spatial analysis of legislative voting. Even in the Canadian Parliament, it is possible that lawmakers may simply be voting along a single issue dimension.
However, as (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007) explain, even in the United States Congress, we can find certain issues over which party loyalty is much weaker.
The civil rights controversies of the 1960s is a good example of this. It it during that time that Southern Democrats were most likely to vote against their own party on issues related to race and segregation.
In a two-party system like in the United States, some level of intra-party division is necessary to have a second dimension of voting in the legislature.
But in Canada, this is not a necessary condition since there is a clear multiparty system. Party loyalty is indeed much stronger, but we also find as much as five different parties with elected members in the Commons. And since some of these parties claim to represent distinct regional interests, it is quite possible that we will find a strong second dimension of conflict in the legislature even if there is a very small amount of intra-party division.
[ We also find that adding a second dimension to the model does not improve the prediction success rate for the remaining parties in both parlia- the Republican Party that the U.S. Congress returned to a more stable unidimensional legislature. We believe that a gradual party realignment will be harder to achieve in Canada since regional demands remain strong.
The roots of this regional polarization can be linked to federalism and 
12
Even though both countries elect representatives with a plurality voting method which should theoretically favor a two-party system (Cox, 1997) ,
Canada is clearly a multi-party system. We believe that this difference is related to the nature of responsible government. Since the U.S. Constitution separates executive and legislative powers, the incentives for a strong level of party discipline is much weaker in Congress. This characteristic implies that representatives can break-away from their own caucus to support their constituent's regional interests. This is not so much the case in the 3 The model can be described as follows: The data has n legislators. They vote on m proposals. On each vote j=1,...,m, legislator i=1,...,n chooses between a "Yea" position ζ j and a "Nay" position ψ j located in the Euclidian space, R d where d is the number of dimensions. Then, y ij = 1 if legislator i votes Yea on division j and y ij = 0 if she votes Nay. The revealed position of legislator i is θ i ∈ R d , while η ij and ν ij are stochastic elements whose distribution is jointly normal. Assuming quadratic loss functions, the utility for legislator i of voting Yea on proposal j is U i (ζ j ) = −||θ i − ζ j || 2 + η ij . Similarly, the utility of voting no is U i (ψ j ) = −||θ i − ψ j || 2 + ν ij . The variance of the stochastic elements is (η ij − ν ij ) = σ 2 j . The Euclidean norm is · . Utility maximizing implies that legislator i votes "Yea" on vote j if U i (ζ j ) = − θ i − ζ j 2 + η ij > U i (ψ j ) = − θ i − ψ j 2 + ν ij and "Nay" otherwise. The model can be re-parameterized as a hierarchical probit model P (y ij = 1) = Φ(β j θ i − α j ), where
. Φ(·) is the standard normal function. θ i is legislator i's revealed position. Decision to support of oppose a bill are reached by comparing the utility that characterized both alternatives. Legislators vote for the alternative that minimizes their loss in utility.
ferences used in this analysis are from 100 relatively independent samples of the posterior distribution. To ensure global identification and to make the estimated Euclidian space comparable across two distinct parliaments, the results were post-processed. More precisely, the location of three legislators, serving in both terms were fixed. All other parameters were adjusted relative to these locations iteration by iteration. Monte Solberg, from the Reform/Conservative party was given the position -1,-1 (first dimension, second dimension). Joseph Volpe, form the Liberal party was given the location 1,0. And Stephane Bergeron from the Bloc Quebecois was given the position -1,1 in both sessions. These constraints permit us to compare the location of all legislators across terms since the estimated positions are relative to these three legislators in both the 35 th and 38 th Parliaments (for a discussion about identification, see Rivers, 2003) .
7 Numbers cited in Malloy (2003) . th Parliament, and one of them, Jean Charest, voted only on five occasions. The lower unity score for the Liberals in the 38 th Parliament is explained by the fact that this party formed a minority government, and that certain MPs were less willing than the leadership to compromise with other parties. We will return to this finding later in the paper. 
